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Abstract 
We analyze corporate fraud in a setting in which managers have superior information but are biased against 
liquidation, because of their private benefits from empire building. This may induce them to misreport information 
and even bribe auditors when liquidation would be value-increasing. To curb fraud, shareholders optimally design 
internal corporate governance, by choosing audit quality and managerial compensation. Both internal governance 
mechanisms tend to substitute for poor shareholder protection; in contrast, audit quality tends to complement 
stricter  auditing  regulation. We  also  find  that  severance  pay  dominates  both  equity  and  option-based  pay  in 
improving managerial incentives. 
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1. Introduction 
The desire to keep or increase their private benefits of control often biases managers in favor of 
corporate  expansion  plans,  even  when  these  are  unprofitable,  and  against  liquidation  or 
restructuring  decisions,  even  when  these  would  be  desirable.  But  shareholders  can  design  the 
internal governance of the company so as to mitigate this managerial bias toward empire building 
and against efficient liquidation. To this purpose, they can rely on two main mechanisms. First, they 
can rely on monitoring, for instance by appointing auditors and independent directors to verify the 
information  provided  by  managers  and  oversee  their  decisions.  Second,  they  can  design  the 
compensation  of  managers  so  as  to  induce  them  to  provide  truthful  information  on  the  firm’s 
prospects  and  to  deter  them  from  inducing  auditors  to  validate  false  accounting  data.  To  this 
purpose, one can combine a variety of contractual schemes, ranging from equity and option-based 
compensation to severance pay. 
The design of internal corporate governance does not occur in a void, however: its effectiveness 
in controlling managerial incentives depends non-trivially on external governance rules, that is, on 
the  legal  provisions  that  constrain  the  extraction  of  private  benefits  of  control,  and  those  that 
enhance the reliability of the information reported by managers. The purpose of this paper is to 
analyze how external governance rules affect the internal governance of companies, and how they 
jointly affect managerial incentives and corporate investment decisions.  
On  the  whole,  our  analysis  underscores  that  different  external  governance  provisions  have 
opposite effects on the internal governance of firms: some act as substitutes of internal governance 
mechanisms,  while  others  enhance  their  effectiveness,  and  therefore  complement  them. 
Specifically, rules that directly constrain the magnitude of the private benefits that managers can 
extract,  such  as  norms  forbidding  or  limiting  related  party  transactions,  will  tend  to  be  partly 
counteracted by weaker internal governance: for instance, they may induce firms to lower the pay-
performance  sensitivity  of  managers’  compensation  or  invest  fewer  resources  in  auditing. 
Conversely, rules that enhance the monitoring mechanisms available to shareholders, such as those 
that promote the loyalty of auditors or independent directors, will encourage companies to step up 
monitoring activities in their internal governance. 
This distinction is relevant to a recent strand of empirical research that tests whether firm-level 
internal  governance  tends  to  substitute  or  complement  country-level  external  governance.  The 
evidence is ambiguous. Several studies suggest that internal and external governance are substitutes 
in their effects on company valuation (Aggarwal Erel, Stulz and Williamson, 2007; Chhaochharia   8 
and  Laeven,  2009;  Durnev  and  Kim,  2005,  Klapper  and  Love,  2004,  and  Lins,  2003).  But 
Aggarwal,  Erel,  Stulz  and  Williamson  (2009)  report  “evidence  that  investment  in  internal 
governance  and  investor  protection  are  complements  rather  than  substitutes”  (p.  3167):  foreign 
firms  invest  less  in  internal  governance  mechanisms  to  protect  minority  shareholders  than 
comparable U.S. firms. This finding is consistent with that of Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007), 
who document a positive correlation between company-level governance scores and the country-
level degree of shareholder protection in financially developed countries, though not for emerging 
market countries. Our model suggests that the sign of this correlation may depend on the specific 
external governance provisions under investigation, the key distinction being between those that 
directly limit private benefits of control and those that enhance the effectiveness of monitoring 
within companies. 
We study these issues in a model where managers are better informed than investors, but, due to 
the private benefits of empire building, may have the incentive to misreport information and even to 
bribe auditors when liquidation would be optimal. Poor external corporate governance strengthens 
their  bias  against  liquidation  and  their  incentive  to  fraudulent  accounting.  To  explore  how  the 
company’s internal governance reacts to external governance rules, initially we hold managerial 
compensation fixed – assuming that management has an exogenously given equity stake – and 
focus on the role of auditing as an internal governance mechanism. Auditing is taken to include not 
only checks by outside auditing firms but also verification of corporate accounts by internal auditors 
and  independent  directors.  The  informational  basis  of  corporate  policies  can  be  improved  by 
stepping up any of these activities.
1 
The  optimal  audit  quality  turns  out  to  have  a  non-monotonic  relationship  with  shareholder 
protection. With poor shareholder protection, auditors are ineffective and so hardly worth hiring, 
since  managers  would  bribe  them  anyway  to  avoid  liquidation.  In  an  intermediate  range  of 
shareholder protection, it becomes optimal to hire auditors to deter managerial fraud. Over this 
range, the better is shareholder protection the less is to be invested in auditing. In the limit, when 
external governance is very good, auditing is again useless: if managers are very well aligned with 
shareholders, they can be trusted to do the right thing. Also the regulation of auditing firms affects 
optimal audit quality: the stricter is auditing regulation, the less likely that auditors will take bribes 
                                                 
1 In the case of external auditors, audit quality can be improved by increasing the accuracy of verification, for 
instance  by  requiring  external  confirmation  of  the  company’s  credits,  performing  on-site  inspections  of 
inventories and directly interviewing managers and employees at various levels. In general, this greater 
verification effort by auditors involves costs in terms of man-hours by qualified personnel and other costs, 
and so translates into steeper auditing costs for the customer company.   9 
from managers to misreport information, so that it is worth spending more resources on auditing. 
Thus,  audit  quality  has  a  relationship  of  substitutability  with  shareholder  protection  but  one  of 
complementarity with auditing regulation. 
In the second part of the paper, we let shareholders choose jointly audit quality and managerial 
compensation.  An  incidental  but  important  result  is  that  in  this  model  optimal  compensation 
invariably takes the form of “paying the CEO for reporting bad news”, which can be interpreted as 
severance pay, since bad news are followed by liquidation of the company. We find that if audit 
quality  and  severance  pay  are  chosen  optimally  and  jointly,  an  improvement  in  shareholder 
protection tends to trigger decreased reliance on both. Conversely, stricter auditing regulation has 
opposite effects on the two dimensions of internal governance: it calls for reduced severance pay, 
but for enhanced auditing intensity. In summary, while in general internal corporate governance 
tends to have a substitutability relationship with external governance rules, an important exception 
arises in the case of the relationship between audit quality and the strictness of auditing regulation, 
which are complements. 
Another byproduct of the analysis is that equity-based and option-based compensation play no 
role  in  optimal  managerial  compensation.  This  is  because  the  agency  problem  analyzed  in  the 
model arises from the “empire-building bias” of the management, rather than from the inefficiently 
low provision of managerial effort. This bias is effectively tempered by severance pay, in line with 
the results of Levitt and Snyder (1997), Inderst and Müller (2008), Eisfeldt and Rampini (2008) and 
Laux (2008). Equity-based compensation is a less efficient way to affect this bias, because it does 
so at the cost of giving the manager a rent in good states. Option-based compensation is even less 
appropriate: it provides no penalty for inefficient continuation, and may actually exacerbate the 
manager’s continuation bias (if options have short vesting). 
Our  paper  is  related  to  recent  literature  on  managerial  fraud.  While  our  analysis  takes  into 
account that shareholders can restrain managers’ incentives to engage in fraud both via the design 
of their compensation and via the intensity of auditing, related papers tend to concentrate on each of 
these  two  levers  separately:  for  instance,  Goldman  and  Slezak  (2006)  focus  on  equity-based 
compensation,
2 while Povel, Singh and Winton (2008) analyze investors’ monitoring effort.
3  
                                                 
2 Benmelech, Kandel and Veronesi (2007) also focus on equity-based compensation when managers can lie 
about the firm’s growth prospects, and show that in a dynamic setting it is optimal to index managerial 
compensation both to the stock performance and to the company’s earnings. Like Goldman and Slezak 
(2006), they do not consider monitoring as an additional governance tool.   10 
Our model of auditing is related to the analysis of Dye (1993). There, however, audit quality is 
assumed to be unobservable, which directly generates an agency problem.
4 In contrast, in our model 
audit quality is observable, the agency problem arises from the manager’s superior information and 
imperfect alignment with shareholders, and it may extend to auditors if managers bribe them. Our 
problem  is  more  akin  to  that  studied  by  Kofman  and  Lawarrée  (1993),  where  an  imperfectly 
informed agent – the auditor – plays a useful role in monitoring a perfectly informed one – the 
manager – because his incentives are better aligned with those of the principal. The key difference 
is that in our setting external corporate governance affects the severity of managerial moral hazard, 
and thereby optimal auditing intensity as well as executive compensation.
5  
Finally, a growing empirical literature has investigated how the incidence of managerial fraud 
responds to the internal governance of firms and to auditing quality, broadly defined to include the 
monitoring  activity  of  independent  directors.  In  accordance  with  our  predictions,  earnings 
restatements are less frequent in firms whose board or audit committees include an independent 
director with financial expertise (Agrawal and Chada, 2005) and the incidence of accounting fraud 
and earnings manipulation is lower in companies with more independent boards (Beasley, 1996; 
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1996; Klein, 2002). Another strand of the empirical literature has 
analyzed the relationship between managerial incentive pay and accounting fraud. Bergstresser and 
Philippon (2006), Burns and Kedia (2006), Kedia and Philippon (2007) and Peng and Röell (2008) 
document that high-powered incentive schemes (especially options) are positively correlated with 
proxies  for  accounting  fraud,  such  as  discretionary  accruals,  fraud  accusations,  accounting 
                                                                                                                                                                  
3 These papers differ from ours in other respects as well. In Goldman and Slezak (2006), equity-based 
compensation elicits managerial effort but also induces managers to manipulate earnings to boost stock 
prices. In our model, by contrast, manager’s incentive to misreport derives from an empire-building motive, 
and equity-based compensation mitigates managerial fraud. This is because we assume equity-based pay to 
be indexed to the final value of stocks, and not to a short-term stock price that managers can manipulate, as 
in Goldman and Slezak. Povel, Singh and Winton (2008) focus on how investors’ monitoring activity varies 
over the business cycle. They show that in booms investors exert less effort to verify managerial information, 
because their beliefs about investment opportunities are more optimistic than in a slump. This implies that 
the incidence of corporate fraud is greater in booms than in slumps, a prediction that Wang, Winton and Yu 
(2008) show to be consistent with the evidence. 
4 In Dye (1993) the problem is resolved by litigation, insofar as auditors have wealth that damaged clients 
can seize. Immordino and Pagano (2007) show how the agency problem can be tempered by regulations 
imposing minimum audit standards. 
5 There are two other substantial modeling differences. First, Kofman and Lawarrée assume two auditors, a 
corruptible but costless internal auditor and an incorruptible but costly external one, while in our setting there 
is a single auditor, who is both costly and corruptible. Second, they make different assumptions regarding the 
state in which the manager has the incentive to bribe the auditor, so that collusion can only occur in the good 
state, whereas under our assumptions it may occur only in the bad state.  
   11 
restatements  and  security  class  action  litigation.  The  contribution  of  our  paper  to  this  line  of 
research is to show not only that the incidence of corporate fraud is affected by auditing quality and 
managerial compensation, but that both of these aspects of the internal governance of firms are 
endogenous, being optimally chosen by shareholders in response to public policy parameters  – 
shareholder protection and auditing regulations – as explained above. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out the model and its assumptions, Section 3 
derives  the  optimal  choice  of  auditing  quality  for  given  managerial  compensation,  Section  4 
analyzes  the  optimal  choice  of  managerial  compensation,  and  Section  5  draws  it  all  together, 
deriving  the  optimal  internal  governance  regime  for  each  possible  configuration  of  external 
governance parameters. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The model 
Consider a firm worth  0 V , whose continuation requires an expenditure of size I. Otherwise, the 
company is liquidated at its status-quo value  0 V .
6 If shareholders decide to invest the resources I, 
the final value of the company changes to  1 0 V V V I = + - ɶ , where V ɶ  is a random variable that equals 
H V I >  in a good state occurring with probability  (0,1) pÎ  or  L V I <  in a bad state occurring with 
probability 1-p. Thus, the investment I is profitable in the good state s = H  but not in the bad state 
s = L.  
There are three players: (i) a manager (M), who owns a minority stake  g  of the company’s 
shares and runs the company; (ii) shareholders (S), who own the remaining stake 1 g -  and decide 
whether to invest and whether to hire an auditor; and (iii) an auditor, who provides a report of 
quality q for an audit fee  F .
7 We assume risk neutrality, no discounting  and limited liability. 
Moreover, for simplicity we set the reservation utility of the manager at zero, so that it is never 
optimal to pay a fixed salary to the manager. 
If shareholders decide not only to invest I but also to hire an auditor, the company disburses an 
audit fee, so that the required expense is I +F . If the company continues to operate, its manager 
can divert an amount of corporate resources  0 D >  and appropriate it as private benefits, decreasing 
                                                 
6 Alternatively, the choice may be interpreted as one between a status quo where the firm retains its existing 
capital stock and an expansion plan whereby it undertakes a new project costing I .  
7 For the definition of auditing quality q, see below.   12 
the company’s value by the same amount;
8 under liquidation, for simplicity private benefits are set 
to zero.
9 The manager has no wealth when shareholders hire him, and his private benefits cannot be 
seized: jointly with the limited liability assumption, this implies that his compensation is never 
negative. 
The  unconditional  expectation  of  the  firm’s  incremental  value  is  assumed  to  exceed  the 
investment I:   (1 ) H L V D pV p V D I - = + - - > . Therefore, managerial diversion is not so large as 
to prevent the firm from investing, but it can lead to a misallocation of resources, by inducing 
continuation even in the bad state.
10 
Since  D  is  the  maximum  private  benefit  that  the  manager  can  extract  without  risking  legal 
sanctions,  the  expected  profit  that  management  cannot  appropriate,  P V I D º - - ,  is  a  natural 
measure of shareholder protection, namely of the degree to which regulation and its enforcement 
constrain managerial opportunistic behavior, such as tunneling corporate resources via related party 
transactions. But shareholder protection P is only one of the two dimensions through which legal 
institutions can affect the agency problem within the firm: the other is the regulation of auditing, 
which sets penalties for unloyal auditors as well as for managers who attempt to bribe auditors. The 
stricter is auditing regulation, the larger is the fear of sanction and therefore the “reservation bribe” 
that auditors will require from management to engage in fraud. So this reservation bribe, that we 
shall denote by B , can be viewed as a measure of the strictness of auditing regulation.   
We shall refer to shareholder protection P and strictness of auditing regulation  B  as the two 
dimensions of the external corporate governance, as they are set by public policy and taken as given 
by firms. But shareholders also have two internal governance levers at their disposal to maximize 
the  firm’s  expected  continuation  value:  audit  quality  and  managerial  compensation.  They  can 
realign managers’ incentives to their own by  raising audit quality q,  for instance  by allocating 
spending more resources on auditing or by appointing highly skilled independent directors: better 
auditing  enables  them  to  check  the  truthfulness  of  managers’  reports  on  the  profitability  of 
continuation. In the baseline model, the incentive effect of managerial compensation is held fixed, 
                                                 
8 The results of the model would not be qualitatively affected by allowing for deadweight costs of managerial 
diversion. An increase in these deadweight costs is tantamount to a reduction in D within the current setting. 
9 Our results survive even if the manager’s private benefits are positive with liquidation, provided they are 
lower than with continuation. 
10 Under the opposite assumption, the unconditional value of the firm under continuation would be negative, 
so that the inefficiency would be the reverse from our setting: the firm would be liquidated too often, not too 
seldom. But the basic logic of the model would be similar.   13 
being  captured  by  an  exogenously  given  equity  stake  g .  However,  subsequently  we  allow  for 
complete flexibility in the choice of the managerial compensation scheme, our ultimate aim being to 
characterize  the  optimal  design  of  internal  governance  –  the  joint  choice  of  audit  quality  and 
managerial compensation – as a function of external governance parameters, that is, shareholder 
protection P and strictness of auditing regulation  B . The assumption that shareholders can design 
the company’s internal corporate governance presupposes that ownership is not so dispersed as to 
prevent their ability to pursue their common interest. Otherwise, even decisions such as the choice 
of auditors would be captured by the manager, thereby making agency problems more severe. 
In the following subsections we complete the description of the game, presenting the players’ 
payoffs, the game’s structure and the equilibrium concept to be used in its solution. 
 
2.1 Payoffs 
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For simplicity, we assume the company’s initial value  0 V  to be large enough that its final value is 
never negative.
11 Shareholders’ wealth is a fraction 1 g -  of this final value, so that their payoff is:  
1 (1 )
h h
S V g P = - ,           (2) 
where  , . h c l =  Shareholders have no private information about the company’s final value. Since 
V D I - > , lacking any other information they will always opt for continuation, even in the bad 
state where this is inefficient. However, they may improve their decision by using the reports of  the 
manager and/or the auditor.  
                                                 
11 The model could easily accommodate the case in which the company goes bankrupt when investment is 
undertaken in the bad state. In this case, due to limited liability shareholders would get a zero payoff from 
their holdings.   14 
Unlike shareholders, the manager has perfect knowledge of the company’s final value  1
c V  under 




M c V D g P = + × ,          (3) 
where  , h c l =   and  1c  is  an  indicator  function  equal  to  1  under  continuation  and  0  under 
liquidation.
13 Expression (3) presupposes that the manager cannot trade  his stake  g  before the 
company’s final value is publicly known (“long vesting”). Even though the manager knows whether 
continuation  is  worthwhile  or  not,  he  may  not  have  the  incentive  to  report  1
c V   truthfully  to 
shareholders: he may prefer continuation even when it is not value-increasing, if the private benefit 
D that he expects to realize exceeds the loss on his stake g . 
Auditing should allow shareholders to base their investment decision on reliable information that 
cannot  be  obtained  from  the  firm’s  manager.  Auditors  have  a  costly  technology  that  helps  to 
determine whether continuation will increase or decrease the company’s value, and they use it to 
produce  a  report  { } , A L H r V V Î .
14  An  audit  varies  in  quality,  depending  on  the  procedures  that 
adopted  (e.g.,  external  confirmation  of  accounting  data).  We  denote  audit  quality  by  [0,1] qÎ , 
where higher q corresponds to a more precise signal about the company’s final value but implies a 
higher  cost  according  to  a  function  C(q)  that  is  continuous,  increasing  and  convex  in  q,  with 
(0) 0 C =  and 
0




= . The idea that audit quality is a choice variable is consistent with the 
evidence surveyed by Francis (2004), who documents that clients can raise the quality of auditing 
by picking auditing firms that are larger or more specialized in their industry. 
The auditor’s signal is perfectly accurate when the state is H, but it may be inaccurate if the state 
is L. Formally, the conditional probabilities of the auditor’s report being correct are: 
                                                 
12 This private benefit is assumed to reduce the monetary benefits accruing to shareholders. However, the 
results would be qualitatively unchanged if private benefit had been modeled as a non-monetary gain that 
does not decrease the gain to shareholders.  
13  In  principle,  shareholders  could  assign  to  the  manager  a  fraction  of  the  company’s  value  increment 
1 0 ( )
h V V g -  alone. However, this would imply that the manager’s monetary payoff would be negative in the 
bad state, which would conflict with the manager’s limited liability. 
14  Outside  auditors  assess  the  reliability  of  the  historical  and  prospective  information  provided  by  the 
company’s  accountants  and  deliver  this  “certified”  information  to  investors  who  use  it  to  evaluate  the 
company. As in Dye (1993), here too these two phases (data validation and valuation) are collapsed into a 
single step, by viewing the auditor’s report as an assessment of the company’s value.   15 
Pr( | ,  ) ,
Pr( | ,  ) 1.
r L s L q q
r H s H q
= = =
= = =
            (4) 
This assumption is quite natural in our context, where the manager observes the true state of nature 
and wishes the firm to  continue: in the  good state the manager  will convey  to the auditor the 
evidence in his possession to show that continuation is worthwhile, and by the same token he will 
not caution the auditor against any mistake that he may make when the state is bad. This can be 
thought of as a reduced form of a communication stage between the manager and the auditor. 
We assume that audit quality is contractible, so that the auditor’s fee  ( ) F q  can be conditioned 
on it.
15 To meet the participation constraint of auditors, their fee must cover their costs, that is, 
( ) ( ) F q C q ³ . We assume competition between auditors.
16 
If the auditor has discovered that the firm’s incremental value is low ( L V V = ), the manager may 
attempt to bribe him into reporting  H V . As such, bribery cannot occur in the good state ( H V V = ), 
where  the  auditor’s  report  would  be  favorable  to  continuation  anyway.
17  As  already  explained 
above, the auditor has a reservation bribe: he will not lie unless he gets at least a bribe  B , which 
reflects  the  fear  of  sanction  for  unloyal  behavior  (i.e.  both  the  severity  of  sanctions  and  the 
effectiveness of their enforcement).  The actual bribe is determined by a take-it-or-leave-it offer:
18 
the manager pays the reservation bribe  B  and gains the surplus stemming from the more likely 
continuation. Note that the reservation bribe  B  may also reflect a penalty inflicted on the manager 
if found out attempting to corrupt the auditor – a penalty that Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2009) show 
to be quite sizeable for U.S. managers.
19 In any event, what matters is the total expected penalty 
                                                 
15 We assume that the fee is not conditional on the ex-post accuracy of the report. If optimally designed by 
shareholders, such a fee could help deter bribe-taking by the auditor. However, the analysis under this more 
sophisticated contract yields no qualitatively new insights and is considerably more complex. Moreover, 
managers could take advantage of contingent auditing fees to bribe auditors more effectively, rather than to 
deter them from bribing. This may explain why contingent audit fees are not observed in actual practice. 
16 The model could easily allow for auditors’ rents arising from market power. The only significant effect of 
this would be that the manager’s ability to bribe auditors would be correspondingly reduced, since the danger 
of losing a higher fee would induce auditors to behave better.  
17 We rule out the possibility for the auditor to blackmail the manager when the signal is positive, thus 
obtaining a bribe in this state of nature as well.  
18 This assumption is made only for simplicity. Allowing for more general assumptions about the bargaining 
power of the manager and the auditor would leave the equilibrium qualitatively unaffected.  
19 They show that U.S. managers identified as responsible for financial misrepresentation by the SEC or the 
Department  of  Justice  face  significant  disciplinary  penalties:  the  majority  of  them  are  fired,  and  bear   16 
inflicted on both parties if fraud is detected. When indifferent, the manager is assumed to prefer not 
to bribe. If the auditor does not accept the bribe, he will misreport the state of the world only by 
mistake, wrongly reporting  A H r V =  in the bad state. This occurs with probability  (1 )(1 ) p q - - , 
where 1 p -  is the probability of the bad state and 1 q -  is the probability of an inaccurate report.   
For auditing to play a beneficial role in the allocation of investment, its cost to the firm must not 
be prohibitively high, so we assume that at least in the good state the company makes a profit even 
after paying for the cost of auditing, that is  0 0 H V V I D F + - - - > , where F is optimally chosen by 
shareholders.  The  precise  parameter  restrictions  that  are  implied  by  this  assumption  will  be 
specified below, once the optimal audit contract has been characterized.  
 
2.2. Structure of the game 
There are six stages, as shown in the time line of Figure 1. At stage 0, shareholders choose the 
manager’s compensation contract. In the baseline version of the model, we skip this stage, and 
assume a given equity stake  g ; in Section 4, instead, we will solve for the optimal compensation  
contract.  At  stage  1,  nature  (N)  determines  the  incremental  value  of  the  company  under 
continuation:  H V   with  probability  p  and  L V   with  probability  1 p - .  At  stage  2,  the  manager 
observes the state of nature and reports  { } , M L H r V V Î  to shareholders, either truthfully or not.  At 
stage 3, shareholders decide whether to engage an auditor. If they opt not to audit, they must then 
decide whether or not to invest solely on the basis of the manager’s report. In this case the game is 
over and its payoffs are realized; if they elect to get an auditor’s opinion, the game moves to the 
next stage. At stage 4, the auditor observes the signal concerning the state, may or may not accept a 
bribe from the manager, and files a report  { } , A L H r V V Î . Finally, at stage 5, shareholders make 
their investment choice based on both the manager’s and the auditor’s reports, and payoffs are 
realized. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
The extensive form of the game is illustrated by the tree in Figure 2, where each node is marked 
by the initial of the player moving. To save space, we omit payoffs at the final nodes.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
substantial financial losses in the form of fines, restrictions on shareholdings and on subsequent employment, 
while 28 percent of them face criminal penalties, including jail sentences.   17 
[Insert Figure 2] 
After the stage-1 move by nature (N), the manager (M) files a report to shareholders: at stage 2 
his action is  { } 2 , a L NL Î , where L stands for “lying” and NL for “no lying”. If indifferent, he is 
assumed to prefer not to lie.
20 
At stage 3, shareholders (S) decide whether to audit, and set the audit quality q by maximizing 
their expected payoff conditional on the manager’s report,  E( | )
h
S M r P   , where 
h
S P  is defined by 
(2).  So they choose action  { } 3 , , a A NAI NANI Î , where A stands for “audit”, NAI  for “no audit and 
investment”, and NANI for “no audit and no investment”. In the figure, shareholders’ uncertainty 
about the company’s value is captured by marking the nodes that they consider as belonging to the 
same information set either by  i G  (if the manager reports  L V ) or by  i L  (if the manager reports 
H V ),  for  1,2 i = .   
If an auditor is hired, the game moves to stage 4, where nature determines the auditor’s signal 
about firm value: under our assumptions, this signal is always correct in the good state, while it is 
correct with probability q in the bad one. In the latter case, the manager may try to bribe the auditor 
to issue a positive report  A H r V =  anyway.
21 Offering a bribe is denoted as action B, not doing so as 
NB.  The manager chooses  { } 4 , a B NB Î  so as to maximize his payoff 
h
M P , defined by (3).
22  
At stage 5, shareholders decide whether to invest (I) or not (NI). They take this decision, denoted 
by  { } 5 , a I NI Î , by maximizing their expected payoff conditional on the reports  { } , M A r r  of the 
manager and the auditor,  E( | , )
h
S M A r r P   . In this case 
h
S P  is net of the audit cost F. But since this 
cost is paid irrespective of the investment decision (i.e., at this stage it is sunk), it does not affect the 
choice between I and NI. Now the shareholders’ uncertainty about the value of the company is 
captured by marking the nodes that belong to the same information sets either by  j Q  (if both 
                                                 
20 This tie-breaking condition can be rationalized with the presence of a small psychological cost of lying, or 
a reputational cost in the presence of a small probability of detection. 
21 Since the accounting information on which the auditor bases his report is provided by the manager, it is 
natural to assume that the latter knows whether the auditor has received a negative signal, which is the only 
case in which bribing him may benefit the manager. 
22 Unlike the shareholder, the manager does not maximize an expected payoff but its realized value, because 
he has perfect knowledge of the true state of nature.    18 
manager and auditor report  H V ) or by  j Y  (if the manager reports  L V  and the auditor report  H V ) ,  
for  1,2,3 j = . 
 
2.3. Strategies and equilibrium concept 
The  shareholders’  strategy  is  a  couple  ( ) 3 5 ( ), ( , ) S M M A a r a r r s = :  they  take  the  investment 
decision at stage 3 conditional only on the manager’s report, or else at stage 5, conditional also on 
the  auditor’s  report.  The  manager’s  strategy  is  a  couple  ( ) 2 4 2 ( ), ( , ) M L a V a V a s = ɶ   ,  where  the 
decision on lying,  2( ) a V ɶ , is conditional on the actual value of the company, while that on bribing, 
4 2 ( , ) L a V a , also depends on whether the manager himself has previously lied or not.  
At stages 3 and 5, shareholders choose their actions based on beliefs about the state of nature, 
conditional  on  their  information:  their  belief  of  being  in  the  good  state  is  denoted  by 
( ) Pr( | ) M H M r V V r b = = ɶ  at stage 3, and by  ( , ) Pr( | , ) M A H M A r r V V r r b = = ɶ  at stage 5. 
In  what  follows,  we  will  seek  the  triplet  { } , , S M s s b       that  form  the  pure-strategy  perfect 
Bayesian  equilibria  (PBE)  of  the  game  described  so  far,  showing  that  the  PBE  has  a  unique 
equilibrium outcome. All proofs are in the Appendix. 
 
3. Equilibrium audit quality  
Here we solve for the PBE of the game conditional on a given managerial equity stake γ. We 
leave the determination of the optimal contract to Section 4. We derive the equilibrium strategies 
separately for three regions that differ in the degree of shareholder protection P, which ranges from 
close to 0 when private benefits are maximal to  max P V I = -  when there are no private benefits. 
Shareholder protection is “strong”,  “intermediate” or “weak” depending on whether the private 
benefit  is  small,  intermediate  or  large,  as  specified  below.  We  will  see  that  the  shareholders’ 
incentive  to  audit  differs  across  these  regions  (see  Figure  3,  which  graphs  the  audit  quality 
optimally chosen by shareholders as a function of P, for a given managerial stake γ). 
[Insert Figure 3] 
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3.1. Strong shareholder protection 
This region corresponds to values of the manager’s private benefit small enough that he wishes 
to disclose the true value of the firm under continuation. Suppose that the manager knows that 
shareholders will base their refinancing decision on his report. Then, if the firm’s true continuation 
value is low and the manager files a truthful report, shareholders will not invest and the manager 
will realize only his fraction of the firm’s liquidation value,  0 V g . If instead the manager lies, he 
induces shareholders to invest and his payoff will be  0 ( ) L V V I D D g + - - + , that is, a fraction g of 
the firm’s final value plus his private benefit D. By lying, he makes losses on his equity stake (since 
0 L V I D - - < ) but gains the private benefit D.  He will be indifferent between lying and not lying 
if D takes the threshold value 
     0 ( )
1





.            (5) 
This corresponds to the threshold level of shareholder protection  0 '' P V I D = - - , which can be 
expressed as 
   







p(VH -VL),         (5') 
For values of P below this threshold, the manager will lie. At the threshold or above, he will not.
23 
The region of strong shareholder protection ranges between  '' P  and  max P . This region is non-
empty:  max 0 '' 0 P P D - = > , since by assumption  0 L I V - > . Being equal to  0 D , the length of the 
interval  max [ '', ] P P   is  increasing  in  the  manager’s  stake  γ  and  in  the  loss  L I V -   from  undue 
continuation: as both raise the manager’s loss from continuation, these parameter changes increase 
his propensity to tell the truth, unless his private benefits increase correspondingly.  
If  max [ '', ] P P P Î , the manager’s interest is so well aligned with shareholders that in equilibrium 
the latter do not seek a second opinion from an auditor. Thus in Figure 3 the auditing intensity q in 
this region is zero. More precisely: 
Proposition 1. If  max [ '', ] P P P Î , then the unique equilibrium outcome is such that shareholders do 
not engage an auditor and the first best is achieved. 
                                                 
23 If  0 D D = , our tie-breaking assumption implies that the manager prefers not to lie.   20 
In this case, in equilibrium investment is undertaken only in the good state and no money is 
wasted on engaging an auditor, so the expected return to investment is the maximum  ( ) H p V I - .  
Since  the  manager  diverts  an  amount  D  of  this  surplus,  shareholders  earn  an  expected  payoff 
0 (1 )[ ( )] H V p V I D g - + - - . In this region, we have two equilibria that result in the same investment 
decision but differ in the manager’s strategy. In one the manager never lies, so that shareholders 
invest according to his report. In the other, he always lies, and shareholders adopt a “contrarian” 
strategy investing when the report is negative and not when it is positive. Of course, the outcome in 
the latter equilibrium is the same as in the former. 
 
3.2. Intermediate shareholder protection 
If shareholder protection falls below the threshold  '' P , the manager will lie, so that a second 
opinion by an auditor may help shareholders decide whether to finance the company’s continuation 
– but only if the manager does not bribe the auditor. This requires that the manager’s private benefit 
fall short of another threshold, denoted by  1 D , or equivalently that shareholder protection stays 
above  the  threshold  1 ' P V I D = - - .  To  determine  this  new  threshold,  consider  the  scenario  in 
which the manager expects shareholders to base their investment decision on the auditor’s report, 
the state of nature is bad and the auditor has correctly evaluated the investment. Then, unless the 
manager bribes the auditor, the latter’s report is negative, shareholders abstain from the investment 
and the manager gets  0 ( ) V F g - . If instead the manager wishes to bribe the auditor, he must pay his 
opportunity  cost  B .  In  this  case  shareholders  will  invest  and  the  manager’s  payoff  will  be 
0 ( ) L V V I D F D B g + - - - + - .    By  bribing,  the  manager  loses  monetary  benefits  (since 
0 L V I D - - < ) and the bribe  B , but gains the private benefit D.  Equating these two payoffs, the 
manager is seen to be indifferent when D equals the threshold 







,            (6) 
which corresponds to the critical shareholder protection  








.            (6')   21 
Below this threshold value of P, the manager will bribe. At the threshold and above it, he will not.
24  
The medium shareholder protection interval  ( ', ''] P P    is non-empty, as  '' ' /(1 ) 0 P P B g - = - > , and 
is increasing in  B  and in γ.  Intuitively, if auditors are harder to bribe (higher  B ), the region where 
the manager does not bribe them expands. Indeed, it may expand to the point that the threshold  ' P  
in (6') would take a non-positive value for  (1 ) '' B P g ³ - : since however by definition P must be 
positive, in this case the threshold must be set at zero. This has a nice interpretation: when auditing 
regulation is sufficiently strict, managers can never bribe auditors, even if shareholder protection is 
very poor. In this case, the intermediate region extends from zero to  '' P . The same logic applies to 
a  larger  γ:  if  the  compensation  scheme  aligns  the  manager’s  incentives  more  closely  with 
shareholders’ interests, the no-bribe region expands, and may start at zero. 
Suppose  that  in  this  region  shareholders  engage  an  auditor  who  refuses  a  bribe,  and  invest 
according to his report. (Below we will show that in this region this is the unique equilibrium 
outcome.)  In this case, they want to choose q so as to maximize their expected payoff: 
      { } 0 E( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 )(1 )( ) h
S H L V p V I D q p V I D F g P = - + - - + - - - - - .    (7) 
In this expression, the term  ( ) H p V I D - -  is the expected after-diversion profit in the good state, 
when the firm always continues;  (1 )( ) L p V I D - - -  is its analogue in the bad state, when the firm 
invests only if the auditor makes a mistake, which occurs with probability 1 q - ; and the last term is 
the audit cost.  The shareholders’ expected payoff (7) can be rewritten as: 
       { } 0 E( ) (1 ) (1 )( ) h
S L V V I D q p I V D F g P = - + - - + - - + - .      (7 ') 
Without an auditor, the shareholders would always invest, since the manager would always lie (as 
'' P P < ). So their payoff is equal to their share of the company’s expected value under continuation, 
net  of  the  manager’s  private  benefit,  i.e.  0 (1 )( ) V V I D g - + - - .  Subtracting  this  from  (7 '),  one 
obtains  the  benefit  that  shareholders  draw  from  the  auditor,  i.e.  the  “informational  value”  of 
auditing, (1 ) ( ) L p q I V D - - + , minus its cost F. This value stems from the fact that with probability 
(1 ) p q -  he spares shareholders two losses: the loss  L I V -  from mistaken continuation, and the 
diversion D that goes with it. 
                                                 
24 If  1 D D = , our tie-breaking assumption implies that the manager prefers not to bribe the auditor.   22 
To  determine  optimal  audit  quality,  shareholders  maximize  their  payoff  E( ) h
S P   subject  to 
paying auditors at least their cost. Formally, dropping the terms unaffected by q and F from (7') 
shareholders solve the following problem: 
   
,
max (1 )( ) L
q F
q p I V D F - - + -    ,        (8) 
subject to the auditor’s participation constraint 
            ( ) F C q ³ .            (9) 
The solution to this problem is characterized below. 
Lemma 1. In the equilibrium with auditing, the optimal audit  quality  *( ) q P  is decreasing in the 
degree of shareholder protection P  for  [ ', '') P P P Î . 
The  proof  is  immediate.  In  this  interval,  competition  among  auditors  ensures  that  the 
participation constraint is binding, so that  ( ) F C q = . Replacing this condition in the maximand (8) 
and differentiating with respect to q  yields the following condition for the optimal audit quality:
25 
* (1 )( ) '( ) L p I V D C q - - + = ,         (10) 
that is, audit quality is chosen so as to equate its marginal informational value to its marginal cost. 
Equation (10) can be rewritten as  
[ ]
* (1 ) ( ) '( ) H L p p V V P C q - - - = .                 (10') 
Recalling that the marginal cost  '( ) C q  is increasing in q, optimal quality  * q  is decreasing in the 
degree  of  shareholder  protection  P:  intuitively,  the  more  they  are  protected  by  the  law  against 
managerial diversion, the less willing are shareholders to spend resources on auditing in order to 
prevent diversion when continuation is unwarranted.  
The result described so far rests on the assumption that, for  [ ', '') P P P Î , there is an equilibrium 
with auditing. In this region, in fact,  this is the unique equilibrium outcome: 
                                                 
25 Under our hypotheses on  ( ) C q , this optimality condition identifies a solution 
* 0 q > .   23 
Proposition 2. If  [ ', '') P P P Î , then the unique equilibrium outcome is such that the manager’s 
report is uninformative, shareholders hire an auditor and continuation occurs if and only if his 
report is positive. 
In this region shareholders rely on the auditor even though his information is less precise than 
that  of  the  manager.  This  is  because  the  manager  cannot  be  trusted,  as  his  incentives  are 
insufficiently aligned with shareholders, while the auditor’s imprecise information can be trusted, as 
in this region he will not be bribed.
26  This result is reminiscent of Kofman and Lawarrée  (1993), 
where an imperfectly informed agent helps in monitoring a perfectly informed one because his 
incentives are better aligned with the principal. 
 
3.3. Poor shareholder protection 
This  region  corresponds  to  private  benefits  so  great  that  the  manager  has  the  incentive  for 
bribery, so that shareholders prefer to forgo the auditor’s services. In this region, they also expect 
the manager to lie when the firm’s value is low, and accordingly always invest irrespective of the 
manager’s report. As a result, their expected payoff is:  
0 E( ) (1 )( ) c
S V V I D g P = - + - - .         (11) 
More specifically: 
Proposition  3.  If  (0, ') P P Î ,  then  the  unique  equilibrium  outcome  is  such  that  the  manager’s 
report is uninformative, shareholders do not engage an auditor and continuation  always occurs. 
Intuitively, shareholder protection is so poor that auditing is unable to counteract it. But, as 
already noticed above, this never occurs if auditing regulation is sufficiently strict: if  (1 ) '' B P g ³ - , 
the poor shareholder protection region vanishes,  since  ' 0 P = . In this case, it is always worth hiring 
an auditor, however poor is shareholder protection. 
 
                                                 
26 Note that the pure-strategy equilibrium described by Proposition 2 may not always exist. To understand 
why, consider that through his equity stake g  the manager also contributes to the auditors’ fee F. Thus when 
his private benefit is sufficiently small, he may have no incentive to lie in the bad state if an auditor has been 
engaged, in which case the auditor is no longer necessary. But if no auditor were hired, the manager’s profit 
in the bad state would increase and he would have an incentive to lie.   24 
3.4. Effect of external governance on audit quality 
In this model public policy can affect the agency problem between shareholders and managers in 
two ways, that we refer to as the two external dimensions of corporate governance. It sets the 
degree of shareholder protection against managerial abuses, P, but may also penalize fraudulent 
behavior by auditors and bribery by managers, thus raising the reservation bribe  B . In response to 
the two policy parameters P and  B , shareholders optimally determine their reliance on auditors in 
investment decisions, i.e. audit quality q. 
The analysis set out in the previous sections shows how external corporate governance affects 
audit quality. As Figure 3 illustrates, the response of the optimal audit quality to an improvement in 
shareholder  protection  P  is  non-monotonic:  * q   jumps  from  zero  to  positive  as  P  crosses  the 
threshold  ' P , then starts declining in the intermediate region, and finally drops back to zero upon 
crossing the higher threshold  '' P . So in the regions where shareholder protection is intermediate or 
strong, audit quality tends to act as its substitute: shareholders have less recourse to auditors as they 
feel better protected from managerial expropriation. If shareholder protection is too poor, instead, 
auditing breaks down as an incentive mechanism: for  ' P P < , auditors are never engaged. But, as 
already noted, this region will vanish if the penalties for auditors’ misconduct,  B , are sufficiently 
strict, so that such breakdown of auditing may never be observed, and only the intermediate and 
strong shareholder protection regions would exist. If so, the model predicts that reliance on auditors 
(as measured, for instance, by resources spent on internal auditing) should be decreasing in the 
quality of shareholder protection – the above-noted substitutability relationship. 
It is also worth investigating how audit quality varies as a function of the severity of the penalties 
for auditors’ misconduct,  B , for  a  given degree of shareholder protection P.   From the  above 
analysis,  audit  quality  is  zero  for  ' P P <   and  * q   if  ' P P ³ .  Re-expressed  in  terms  of  B ,  the 
threshold becomes: 
' (1 )( '' ) B P P g = - - , 
which is positive if shareholder protection is in the intermediate region ( '' P P < ). In this case, 
which is illustrated in Figure 4, shareholders will set  0 q =  if  ' B B < , and  * q q =  if  ' B B ³ : this 
illustrates that the audit quality chosen by shareholders is complementary with auditing regulation, 
since it increases from zero to  * q  if the strictness of auditing regulation exceeds the threshold  ' B . If   25 
shareholder protection is strong ( '' P P ³ ), instead, the threshold  ' B  falls to a non-positive value, 
implying that an auditor will be hired ( * q q = ) irrespective of auditing regulation. 
 
 [Insert Figure 4] 
 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the comparative statics of audit quality q with respect to an external 
governance parameter, P and  B  respectively. Figure 5, instead, offers the overall picture, showing 
how these two parameters jointly affect the optimal audit quality, represented as a surface in tri-
dimensional space. We see that moving along the P axis, audit quality is generally decreasing. It is 
non-monotonic only for low values of  B , as illustrated by the bold dashed line to the extreme right, 
which corresponds to Figure 3. For values of  B  larger than  (1 ) '' P g - , audit quality is instead 
decreasing or constant in P, as show by the dashed lines more to the left. Moving instead along the 
B  axis, we obtain the stepwise increasing function of Figure 4, which is illustrated by the other 
bold dashed line cutting across Figure 5. 
 
 [Insert Figure 5] 
 
In conclusion, while shareholder protection tends to act as a substitute for audit quality, the 
strictness of auditing regulation tends to act as its complement. Intuitively, if the law punishes 
corrupt  auditors  more  severely,  shareholders  will  rely  more  on  them,  because  they  are  more 
trustworthy as monitors of management. The empirical prediction is that where auditing regulation 
is stricter, companies are more likely to rely on auditors and pay higher audit fees, even if external 
corporate governance is weak. This is consistent with evidence in Francis and Wang (2008) that 
“Big  4”  auditors  impose  higher  earnings  quality  and  more  accounting  conservatism  on  clients’ 
financial reports in response to stricter auditing regulation, such as greater ability to sue auditors for 
negligence  and  regulatory  sanctions  for  auditors’  misconduct.  Relatedly,  Seetharaman,  Gul  and 
Lynn (2002) report that audit fees are higher for U.K. companies that cross-list in U.S. markets, 
which they interpret as a response by auditors to the higher litigation risk typical of the U.S. system. 
So far, our analysis has taken the managerial equity stake g as given. But to control managers’ 
incentives,  shareholders  can  fine-tune  not  only  the  resources  devoted  to  auditing  but  also 
managerial compensation, and the latter may not be only equity-based. The extent to which they 
rely on each of these two internal governance variables depends on relative costs and effectiveness, 
which in turn depend on external regulatory environment. To address these issues, we turn to stage 
0, the choice of the optimal managerial compensation scheme.   26 
4. Optimal managerial compensation 
So far, to focus on the role of auditing in internal governance, managerial compensation was taken 
to be exogenous, with a given equity stake  g . From here onwards, we shall consider managerial 
compensation as part of the internal governance of the firm, chosen jointly with auditing quality, 
and possibly including a fixed salary, options and severance pay, beside equity-based pay.  
The previous section shows that, depending on the parameters, the continuation decision may be 
based on (i) the manager’s report  M r  alone, (ii) the auditor’s report  A r  alone, or (iii) neither of the 
two. Below we will show that to ensure the truthfulness of each of these reports shareholders must 
rely  on  different  managerial  compensation  schemes:  (i)  for  M r   to  be  reliable,  the  optimal 
managerial compensation is a severance payment; (ii) for  A r  to be reliable, the optimal managerial 
compensation may entail or not a severance pay, depending on the quality of external corporate 
governance. Moreover, it is always optimal to trust either the report of the manager or that of the 
auditor. In what follows, we proceed in two steps. First, we identify the efficient compensation 
scheme to induce truth-telling by the manager and the auditor, respectively. Second, we characterize 
the parameter region in which each compensation scheme yields the largest payoff for shareholders. 
The efficient compensation scheme to ensure truth-telling by the manager is a payment D when 
he reports the bad state and zero otherwise. Under this scheme, in the bad state he receives D if he 
tells the truth and the same amount, as private benefit, if he lies: being indifferent, by our tie-
breaking rule he reports truthfully. In the good state, he gets the private benefit D if he tells the truth 
and  zero  if  he  lies,  so  again  truth-telling  is  assured.
27  This  compensation  scheme  can  be  also 
achieved by making it contingent on the final price of the company: the manager gets zero when the 
company’s  value  is  high  ( 0 H V V I D + - - ,  upon  continuation  in  the  good  state)  or  low 
( 0 L V V I D + - - , upon continuation in the bad state), and D when the value is unchanged ( 0 V , upon 
no continuation in the bad state). The most natural interpretation of this compensation scheme is 
that of a severance payment D, which the manager receives if the firm is liquidated:  
Proposition 4. The optimal compensation to ensure truth-telling by the manager is severance pay 
s D = .  
                                                 
27 Notice that shareholders have no choice but to leave private benefit D to the manager in the good state, 
since by assumption it cannot be seized. In a setting where the manager has a positive reservation utility, this 
private benefit would help satisfy his participation constraint. If his reservation utility exceeds D, then the 
optimal compensation scheme would also have to include a fixed salary.    27 
Therefore, worse external governance (higher private benefits D) implies a larger severance pay. 
This accords with the empirical finding by Rusticus (2006) that the magnitude of severance pay is 
inversely correlated with the quality of governance (as proxied by excess pay to managers) in a 
representative  sample  of  S&P  1500  corporations.  The  result  that  severance  pay  is  an  efficient 
mechanism to elicit bad news from a CEO is also present in Levitt and Snyder (1997), Inderst and 
Müller (2008), Eisfeldt and Rampini (2008) and Laux (2008). In all these studies, severance pay 
induces truth-telling by compensating the manager for his dismissal and/or loss of private benefits. 
Differently from these papers, however, we will show that severance pay is not always the best 
internal governance device from the shareholders’ standpoint: when external corporate governance 
is sufficiently good, it may be dominated by reliance on auditors. 
Truth-telling by auditors requires that managers have no incentive to bribe them. This is always 
the case if the penalties against fraudulent auditing (whether aimed at auditors themselves or at the 
manager) are so large as to exceed the manager’s private benefits of control, that is, if  B D ³ . But 
even if this condition does not hold, it is possible to prevent managers from bribing auditors by 
giving them a large enough severance pay, that is, a payment conditional on auditors correctly 
reporting the bad state (and thus inducing liquidation when appropriate):  
Proposition 5. The optimal compensation to ensure truth-telling by the auditor is severance pay 
s D B = -  if D B > , and  0 s =  otherwise. The optimal auditing quality is  ** q as defined by  
** (1 )( ) '( ) L p I V B C q - - + = .               (12) 
if D B > ; and it is  * q as defined by (10) otherwise. 
Intuitively, this proposition states that the manager should be given a severance pay only when he 
would  otherwise  be  tempted  to  bribe  the  auditor,  that  is,  when  his  private  benefit  exceeds  the 
auditor’s reservation bribe. In this situation, audit quality no longer increases in the size of the 
private benefit, being just a function of the reservation bribe ( ** q  does not depend on D, differently 
from  * q , while it depends on  B ): an increase in audit quality reduces the chance of losing the 
private benefit D to the manager in the bad state, but requires paying him the difference  D B -  as 
severance pay, so that it brings a net gain B , beside the loss from the mistaken investment  L I V - . 
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5. Optimal internal governance regimes 
We are now equipped to characterize the optimal governance regime – that is, the optimal audit 
quality and managerial compensation – for each parameter region. Building on Propositions 4 and 
5, we can establish when shareholders prefer to elicit truth-telling from the manager, the auditor, or 
neither. Their payoffs in these three cases are respectively: 
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where  * q  and  ** q  are defined by equations (10) and (12), respectively. The expression for  ( ) M r P  
follows  directly  from  Proposition  4:  when  shareholders  rely  on  the  manager,  they  give  him 
severance pay D, so that they always end up losing D to the manager: as private benefit in good 
states, or as severance pay in bad ones. In exchange, they benefit from the manager’s accurate 
information, by investing only in the good state. The expression for  ( ) A r P  is the company’s value 
when  shareholders  rely  on  the  auditor,  based  on  Proposition  5.  The  expression  for  ( ) P Æ   is 
intuitive: when shareholders do not care about eliciting truthful information from either the manager 
or the auditor, they will not pay either one, thereby setting  0 s q = = . In this case, however, their 
payoff is simply the company’s unconditional value when investment is always undertaken, so that 
the private benefit D is invariably lost to the manager. This expected payoff is strictly worse than 
( ) M r P , since it entails a worse investment decision but the same wealth loss to the manager, D.  So 
this regime is always dominated – a non-trivial result, since in our model investment has positive 
NPV if undertaken with no information.  
Therefore,  the  relevant  comparison  is  only  between  ( ) M r P   and  ( ) A r P ,  and  the  associated 
compensation schemes of Propositions 4 and 5. A key condition in this comparison is whether 
auditing is cost-efficient compared to elicit truthful revelation from managers, when audit quality is 
set optimally at  * q  in the region B D >  (the most favorable to auditing). The relevant condition is 
                                                   * * * (1 ) (1 )( ) ( ) 0 L p q V I q D C q   - - - + - >   .                             (14)   
If this condition is met, shareholders will choose to hire an auditor ( ( ) ( ) A M r r P > P ) at least in 
some  regions  of  the  parameter  space.  Otherwise,  auditing  will  always  be  dominated   29 
( ( ) ( ) A M r r P < P ) and shareholders will rely on the manager, using severance pay to ensure his 
truthfulness. The following proposition describes the comparison in the various cases: 
Proposition 6.  (i) If condition (14) holds and the reservation bribe exceeds the private benefit 
(B D ³ ), it is optimal to choose audit quality  * q q = from equation (10) and severance pay  0 s = .  
(ii) If condition (14) holds and the reservation bribe  0 ( , ] B B D Î , where  0 B  is the value of  B  such 
that  ( ) ( ) M A r r P = P , then it is optimal to choose audit quality  ** q q =  from equation (12) and 
severance pay s D B = - . 
(iii) In all other cases, it is optimal not to hire an auditor ( 0 q = ) and choose severance pay s D = .  
To grasp the economic significance of this proposition, consider a gradual strengthening of the 
regulation against fraudulent auditing, that is, a gradual increase in the reservation bribe  B  starting 
from zero. For very low values of the reservation bribe ( 0 B B < ), shareholders will choose to elicit 
truth-telling by the manager, compensating them with a severance payment  s D =  irrespective of 
the value of  B , and will not hire an auditor. As the reservation bribe crosses the threshold  0 B , two 
cases can occur, depending on whether auditing, when set at the optimal level  * q , is cost-efficient 
compared with eliciting truth-telling from the manager (that is, whether condition (14) holds or not). 
If it is, then as  B  rises above the threshold  0 B , shareholders will hire an auditor and rely on him 
rather than on the manager for the investment decision, and will gradually raise the audit quality 
and  reduce  the  manager’s  severance  pay  s  as  B   increases  over  the  interval  0 [ , ) B D .
28  As  the 
reservation bribe increases further beyond the threshold D, the audit quality will remain constant at 
the highest value attained in the previous interval, and the manager’s severance s pay falls to zero. 
This  is  shown  in  Figure  6:  as  improvements  in  auditing  regulation  raise  B ,  audit  quality  q 
increases, while severance pay s decreases. So, while optimal audit quality is complementary to 
auditing regulation, severance pay tends to behave as its substitute. 
 
 [Insert Figure 6] 
                                                 
28 An increase in the cost-effectiveness of auditing expands this region: if the efficiency of auditing 
is captured by a parameter q  (that is,  ( , ) C q q  with  0 Cq <  and  0 q C q < ), a larger q  implies a lower 
threshold  0 B , thereby expanding the interval  0 ( , ] B D .    30 
 
The case where auditing is less cost-efficient than eliciting truth-telling from the manager (that is, 
condition (14) is not met) is not shown graphically, being trivial: in that case, it is always optimal to 
set the severance pay at the level of the private benefit (s D = ) and forgo auditing ( 0 q = ). 
From Proposition 6, we can also infer how the degree of shareholder protection,  P V I D º - - , 
affects the internal governance regime. We have to distinguish two cases, depending on whether the 
reservation bribe  B  is below or above the threshold  0 B , and in each of these two cases we must 
distinguish between a strong and a poor shareholder protection region, the boundary between them 
now being defined as the critical protection level  ( ) P B V I B º - -  (where D B = ).  
If the reservation bribe is high, i.e. auditing regulation is good ( 0 B B ³ ), then shareholders will 
always rely on auditing, even though they will choose audit quality as a decreasing function of 
shareholder protection, as shown by the solid line in Figure 7.  If shareholder protection is poor, i.e. 
( ) P P B < , audit quality will be set at the maximal level  ** q , which is invariant to P. In this region, 
the manager will be given severance pay  ( ) s D B P B P = - = - , which is shown as the decreasing 
dashed  line  that  reaches  zero  when  P  hits  the  critical  level  ( ) P B .  Beyond  this  point,  i.e.  for 
( ) P P B ³ , shareholders will gradually lower the audit quality, by setting it at  * q , and stop paying 
severance pay to the manager ( 0 s = ). 
 
 [Insert Figure 7] 
 
The  case  of  a  low  reservation  bribe  ( 0 B B < )  is  illustrated  in  Figure  8.  Then,  if  shareholder 
protection is also low, i.e.  ( ) P P B < , shareholders will elicit information from the manager, setting 
severance  pay  equal  to  private  benefits  ( max s D P P = = - )  and  forgoing  auditing  ( 0 q = ).    If 
shareholder protection is high, i.e.  ( ) P P B ³ , they will instead switch to auditing, choosing its 
quality  * q  as a decreasing function of P, and will pay no severance pay ( 0 s = ).    
 
 [Insert Figure 8] 
 
In both cases, we see that in general there is a relationship of substitutability between shareholder 
protection P and both dimensions of internal governance: as P increases, shareholders tend to rely 
less heavily on both severance pay and audit quality. The only exception is the jump in audit quality   31 
from zero to  * q  in the second case just considered, due to the substitution between the two internal 
governance mechanisms: below the critical protection level  ( ) P B  shareholder rely on the manager, 
paying  him  a  high  severance  pay;  beyond  that  point,  they  rely  on  the  auditor,  and  forgo  all 
severance pay to the manager. 
While Figures 6 to 8 illustrate the comparative statics of the optimal audit quality and managerial 
compensation with respect to the two external governance parameters  B  and P, they may not to 
convey the overall picture of how internal governance regimes respond to these external parameters. 
This is done in the three-dimensional diagrams of Figure 9 and 10, respectively for the optimal 
audit quality and the optimal severance pay. The figures show clearly that there are three distinct 
parameter regions in (B ,P) space – the horizontal plane of the diagrams:  
(i)  a trapezoidal region where auditing regulation is lax ( 0 B B < ) and shareholder protection is 
weak ( ( ) P P B < ): here, audit quality is zero and severance pay is highest and decreasing in P; 
(ii)  a triangular region where auditing regulation is stringent ( 0 B B > ) but shareholder protection 
is still weak ( ( ) P P B < ): here, audit quality is positive and increasing in the stringency of 
auditing  regulation  (though  invariant  to  shareholder  protection),  while  severance  pay  is 
decreasing in both of the external governance parameters;  
(iii)  another triangular region where both auditing regulation and shareholder protection are strong 
( ( ) P P B > , i.e. outside the diagonal connecting the two points on the axes with coordinates 
max P ):  here,  audit  quality  is  positive  and  decreasing  in  shareholder  protection  (though 
invariant to auditing regulation), while severance pay is zero. 
 
 [Insert Figures 9 and 10] 
 
On the whole, the results indicate that internal and external corporate governance mechanisms 
tend to be substitutes. As in the previous section, complementarity between the two arises only from 
the effect of auditing regulation on audit quality: stronger penalties against fraudulent auditors (or 
managers who bribe them) tend to raise the intensity of auditing, and also expand the region in 
which companies rely on it. This provides guidance to assess the effects of public policy on the 
internal  governance  mechanisms  of  firms.  Reforms  that  directly  affect  the  size  of  the  private 
benefits  of  control,  for  instance  by  discouraging  related  party  transactions,  will  tend  to  be 
counteracted by internal governance mechanisms: for instance, they may induce firms to reduce the 
quality of auditing as well as the severance pay of managers. In contrast, reforms that enhance the   32 
monitoring ability of shareholders, such as those that promote the loyalty of auditors, facilitate the 
appointment of independent directors, or simply improve the disclosure of corporate information, 
will encourage companies to step up monitoring activities in their internal governance. In short, the 
first  type  of  reforms  highlights  a  relation  of  substitutability  between  external  and  internal 
governance, while the second underscore their complementarity. 
This distinction is potentially important for empirical research. To this date, most (but not all) 
empirical work suggests that firm-level internal governance tends to substitute for country-level 
external governance, in their effects on company valuation. For instance, Klapper and Love (2004) 
and Durnev and Kim (2005) find that subjective measures of internal governance quality (based on 
Credit  Lyonnais  Securities  Asia  scores)  are  larger  in  countries  with  poor  legal  environments. 
Similarly, Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz and Williamson (2007) and Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009) find 
that firm-level internal governance provisions correlate with valuation, controlling for country-level 
rules,  and  Lins  (2003)  documents  that  the  valuation  impact  of  pyramid  structures  and  non-
management blockholdings is larger in countries with low legal shareholder protection. However, 
Doidge,  Karolyi  and  Stulz  (2007)  find  that  the  correlation  between  company-level  governance 
ratings and country-level shareholder protection standards changes sign depending on the degree of 
financial development: it is positive for countries with developed financial markets, and negative or 
absent  for  countries  with  undeveloped  markets.  So  this  study  appears  to  suggest  that 
complementarity may prevail in certain cases, and substitutability in others. Our model suggests 
that future empirical work should distinguish between external governance provisions that directly 
limit  private  benefits  of  control  and  those  that  enhance  the  effectiveness  of  monitoring  within 
companies, as they should elicit opposite responses from the internal governance of firms. 
Before concluding, it is worth noticing that in our model efficient managerial compensation has 
no role either for equity-based or options-based compensation. This may appear surprising in view 
of the fact that in Section 4 we saw that giving the manager a larger equity stake g  tends to mitigate 
the agency problem, making the manager less prone to misreport accounting information or to bribe 
the company’s auditor. The point is that, even though equity-based compensation does improve the 
manager’s incentives, it does so at a greater cost than severance pay: insofar as it places some 
downside risk on the manager’s shoulders, an equity stake tends to mitigate his continuation bias, 
but at the cost of giving the manager a larger financial payoff in the good state, which has no use in 
terms of managerial incentives.  
Option-based pay is even worse than equity in terms of its effect on managerial incentives in this 
model: either it has no effect on incentives or it worsens the manager’s bias towards inefficient   33 
continuation, depending on whether the options have long and short vesting periods, i.e. can be 
exercised only after the state is publicly known or already at the time of the investment decision 
(stage 5 of the model). If options can be exercised only once the state of nature is public knowledge, 
they do not alter the manager’s incentive to lie or bribe, as they will be in the money only in the 
good state, when the manager already wants to tell the truth so as to pocket the private benefit from 
continuation. Vesting the manager with such options simply imposes a cost on shareholders without 
improving  the  manager’s  incentives.  Therefore,  such  options  are  dominated  by  equity-based 
compensation, which penalizes the manager for inefficient continuation. 
If instead options can be exercised already at the time of investment and their exercise price is 
such that they are in the money if the good state is believed to have occurred, a manager who 
induced investment in the bad state by lying or bribing the auditor, would not only earn the private 
benefit D but also be able to exercise his options. This is tantamount to boosting the private benefits 
from continuation, thus exacerbating the tendency to file fraudulent reports and/or bribe auditors. 
This accords with recent empirical literature showing that the importance of options in managerial 
compensation is correlated with proxies for accounting fraud (see for instance Bergstresser and 
Philippon, 2006, Burns and Kedia, 2006, Kedia and Philippon, 2007, and Peng and Röell, 2008). 
The inefficiency of equity-based and option-based pay in our model arise from the assumption 
that the only agency problem in the company arises from private benefits that bias managers in 
favor of “empire building”. In contrast, in other models of executive compensation call options 
enhance the incentive to exert effort and take risk (see for instance Smith and Stulz, 1985, Hall and 
Murphy,  2000,  and  Dittmann  and  Maug,  2007).  This  illustrates  that  depending  on  the  agency 
problem that executive compensation is supposed to mitigate, the efficient set of financial contracts 
may be dramatically different. It is natural to conjecture that in a more general model where both 
types of agency problems are present, equity, call options and severance pay might all be employed, 




This paper presents a model of managerial fraud where managers possess superior information 
about the prospects of the company but, owing to the private benefits from empire building, have a 
bias against the liquidation of the firm. This may prompt them to misreport their information or 
even  to  bribe  auditors  when  liquidation  would  be  optimal.  We  use  the  model  to  study  how   34 
shareholders should design internal corporate governance so as to curb managerial fraud, along two 
dimensions: the quality of auditing, and the design of managerial compensation.  
Our main contribution is to characterize how both these aspects of the internal governance of 
firms respond to changes in public policy parameters, namely, the degree of shareholder protection 
and the stringency of auditing regulation. Our overall findings are that in countries or industries 
where shareholders are less exposed to the risk of expropriation by managers, they will spend less 
resources  on  auditing  to  check  management  and  also  provide  less  incentives  for  managers  to 
truthfully  report  the  company’s  business  prospects.  Conversely,  in  settings  where  auditing 
regulation punishes more harshly fraudulent auditing, shareholders will spend more resources on 
auditing,  even  though  they  will  again  rely  less  on  compensation  to  provide  correct  managerial 
incentives.  
Therefore, while in general our analysis predicts a relation of substitutability between external 
corporate governance parameters and internal corporate governance choices, it highlights that the 
auditing quality chosen by companies and the strictness of auditing regulation are complements. 
This  is  potentially  useful  for  empirical  research  into  the  company-level  arrangements  that  can 
control corporate fraud. First, both the resources allocated to auditing and the design of managerial 
compensation should be included in empirical studies as potential company-level determinants of 
the  incidence  of  fraud.  Second,  and  more  interestingly,  the  way  in  which  these  dimensions  of 
internal governance respond to regulation is not necessarily one of substitutability, since regulations 
that  enhance  the  effectiveness  of  monitoring  in  corporate  governance  are  predicted  to  promote 
greater reliance on corporate monitors, such as auditors and independent directors.    35 
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Appendix 
 
We  start  by  presenting  three  lemmas  containing  results  that  will  subsequently  facilitate  the 
derivation of equilibria. Lemma A1 identifies preferred choices and beliefs in cases where these do 
not depend on the managerial stake γ. These choices and beliefs will be part of any equilibrium and 
therefore are marked by asterisks. 
Lemma A1.       (i)  * *
5 5 ( , ) ( , ) H L L L a V V a V V NI = = .      (ii)  * * ( , ) ( , ) 0 H L L L V V V V b b = = . 
(iii)  * * ( , ) ( , ) L H H H V V V V p b b = =  when  * *
4 4 ( , )= ( , ) L L a V L a V NL B = . 
(iv)  * * ( , ) ( , ) /[ (1 )(1 )] L H H H V V V V p p p q b b = = + - -  when  * *
4 4 ( , )= ( , ) L L a V L a V NL NB = . 
(v)  * *
5 5 ( , ) ( , ) L H H H a V V a V V I = = . 
Proof of Lemma A1. (i) From Figure 2, it is evident that the couple of reports  ( , ) H L V V  received 
by shareholders corresponds to a singleton, so that they are aware that  L V V =  and therefore prefer 
no investment. The same applies when the couple of reports is ( , ) L L V V .   
(ii) As already explained under (i), the couple of reports  ( , ) H L V V  corresponds to a singleton, so 
that the belief that  H V V =  is zero:  ( , ) 0 H L V V b = . The same applies when the reports is ( , ) L L V V .   
(iii) When the reports received by S are  ( , ) L H V V , the information set is  { } 1 2 3 , , Y = Y Y Y . The 
assumption that B is chosen by M when  L V V =  (whether M previously lied or not) implies that the 
play may have reached node  1 Y  or  2 Y  with probability 1 p - , and  3 Y  with probability p. Hence 
by Bayes’ rule, the belief that  H V V =  is p:  ( , ) L H V V p b = . When the reports received by S are 
( , ) H H V V , the information set is  { } 1 2 3 , , Q = Q Q Q . Using the same argument as before, the play 
may have reached node  1 Q  or  2 Q  with probability 1 p - , and  3 Q  with probability p. Hence by 
Bayes’ rule,  the belief that  H V V =  is p:  ( , ) H H V V p b = .  
(iv) The argument is similar to that used under point (iii), with the only difference that now NB is 
assumed to be chosen by M when  L V V =  (whether he previously lied or not). Then, when the 
reports  received  by  S  are  ( , ) L H V V ,  the  play  may  have  reached  only  node  2 Y   or  3 Y ,  with 
probabilities  (1 )(1 ) p q - -  and p respectively. Hence by Bayes’ rule,  the belief that  H V V =  is p:   39 
[ ] ( , ) / (1 )(1 ) L H V V p p p q b = + - - . When instead the reports received by S are  ( , ) H H V V , the play 
may have reached only node  2 Q  or  3 Q , with probabilities (1 )(1 ) p q - -  and p respectively,  so that 
the belief that  H V V =  is p:  [ ] ( , ) / (1 )(1 ) H H V V p p p q b = + - - .  
(v) When the reports received by  S  are  ( , ) L H V V , from  points (iii) and  (iv) S holds the belief 
( , ) L H V V p b =   if  M  chooses  B,  or  [ ] ( , ) / (1 )(1 ) L H V V p p p q b = + - -   if  M  chooses  NB.  If  M 
chooses  B,  S’s  expected  payoff  from  investing  is  the  unconditional  expectation 
0 (1 )( ) V V I D F g - + - - - , which is to be compared with a payoff  0 (1 )( ) V F g - -  in case of no 
investment.  The  difference  between  these  two  expected  payoffs  is  (1 )( ) V I D g - - - ,  which  is 
positive by assumption. Therefore, S will invest. If instead M were to choose NB, then S’s payoff 
would  be  the  conditional  expectation  0 (1 ) ( , ) L H V E V V V I D F g -  + - - -   ,  which  is  to  be 
compared with a payoff   0 (1 )( ) V F g - - . The difference (1 ) ( , ) L H E V V V I D g -  - -    is larger than 
its unconditional analogue, and therefore it is also positive, so that S would invest.  Therefore, when 
S receive the reports ( , ) L H V V , they will always invest. Using the same reasoning it is easy to show 
that when S receive the reports ( , ) H H V V , they will always invest.   ￿ 
The following lemma shows that in the regions where corporate governance is intermediate or 
good, the manager does not bribe the auditor: 
Lemma A2.  * *
4 4 ( , )= ( , ) L L a V L a V NL NB =  if and only if  1 D D £ .  
Proof of Lemma A2. Suppose that  L V V = , the manager lied (L) and the auditor correctly identified 
the state, which happens with probability q. Then, M must decide whether bribing the auditor or not. 
If he chooses B, then S will receive reports  ( , ) H H V V , and by point (v) of Lemma A1 investment 
will follow. In this case, M’s payoff, net of the bribe  B , equals  0 ( ) L V V I D F D B g + - - - + - . If 
instead M chooses NB, then the reports will be ( , ) H L V V  and no investment will occur (by point (i) 
of Lemma A1). In this case, M’s payoff equals  0 ( ) V F g - . Hence, M’s surplus from choosing B 
over NB is  ( ) L V I D D B g - - + - , which is  positive if  1 D D > , zero if  1 D D =  and negative if 
1 D D < . Recalling our tie-breaking assumption, M opts for NB if and only if   1 D D £ . The same 
argument shows that this result holds also if initially M did not lie (NL).  ￿   40 
The  next  lemma  derives  the  best  response  of  shareholders  for  the  case  where  the  manager 
always reports the truth or never does: 
Lemma  A3.  If  * *
2 2 ( )= ( ) L H a V a V NL = ,  then  *
3( ) H a V NAI =   and  *
3( ) L a V NANI = .  If 
* *
2 2 ( )= ( ) L H a V a V L = , then  *
3( ) H a V NANI =  and  *
3( ) L a V NAI = .  
Proof of Lemma A3. For brevity, we provide a heuristic proof. When M’s preferred choice is 
* *
2 2 ( )= ( ) L H a V a V NL = , the expected payoff to S attains its highest possible value if they chose not 
to audit and invest if and only if  M H r V = . Indeed, this policy leads them to invest only in the good 
state  and  to  save  auditing  costs.  A  symmetric  argument  holds  when  M’s  preferred  choice  is 
* *
2 2 ( )= ( ) L H a V a V L = , in this case, as M lies in a systematic fashion, a “contrarian” investment rule 
couple with no auditing achieves the highest possible payoff for S.  ￿ 
Taken together, Lemmas A1 and A2 identify the best responses of shareholders at stage 5 and the 
best responses of the manager at stage 4. Lemma A3 identifies the best responses of shareholders at 
stage 3 for some of the possible strategies of managers at stage 2.  
Using these results, we can restrict the set of candidate equilibrium strategies to 20 cases, which are 
presented in Table 1 below for  1 D D £ , where  1 D  is defined by equation (6). Each row describes a 
strategy of shareholders (columns 2 to 7) and a strategy of the manager (columns 9 to 14).  
We could produce a similar table for  1 D D > , which would differ from Table 1 only in its two last 
columns, where B would simply replace NB throughout. We omit this second table for brevity. 
A rapid check of Table 1 leaves us with the 8 candidate equilibrium strategies described in the 
following: 
Lemma A4. In Table A1, the strategies subscripted by { } 3,5,6,7,8,11,12,13,16,18,19,20  cannot be 
part of a PBE.    41 
Table A1. Candidate equilibrium strategies for  1 D D £  
  Report  
by M  
( M r ) 
Reports by M  and A 
( , M A r r ) 
  True value  
(V) 
True value and 
stage-2 action by M  
( 2 , V a ) 
S  H V   L V   , H H V V   , H L V V   , L H V V   , L L V V   M  H V   L V   , L V L  , L V NL  
1 S s   NAI  NANI  I  NI  I  NI  1 M s   NL  NL  NB  NB 
2 S s   NANI  NAI  I  NI  I  NI  2 M s   L  L  NB  NB 
3 S s   A  A  I  NI  I  NI  3 M s   NL  L  NB  NB 
4 S s   A  NANI  I  NI  I  NI  4 M s   NL  L  NB  NB 
5 S s   A  NAI  I  NI  I  NI  5 M s   NL  L  NB  NB 
6 S s   NANI  A  I  NI  I  NI  6 M s   NL  L  NB  NB 
7 S s   NANI  NANI  I  NI  I  NI  7 M s   NL  L  NB  NB 
8 S s   NANI  NAI  I  NI  I  NI  8 M s   NL  L  NB  NB 
9 S s   NAI  A  I  NI  I  NI  9 M s   NL  L  NB  NB 
10 S s   NAI  NANI  I  NI  I  NI  10 M s   NL  L  NB  NB 
11 S s   NAI  NAI  I  NI  I  NI  11 M s   NL  L  NB  NB 
12 S s   A  A  I  NI  I  NI  12 M s   L  NL  NB  NB 
13 S s   A  NANI  I  NI  I  NI  13 M s   L  NL  NB  NB 
14 S s   A  NAI  I  NI  I  NI  14 M s   L  NL  NB  NB 
15 S s   NANI  A  I  NI  I  NI  15 M s   L  NL  NB  NB 
16 S s   NANI  NANI  I  NI  I  NI  16 M s   L  NL  NB  NB 
17 S s   NANI  NAI  I  NI  I  NI  17 M s   L  NL  NB  NB 
18 S s   NAI  A  I  NI  I  NI  18 M s   L  NL  NB  NB 
19 S s   NAI  NANI  I  NI  I  NI  19 M s   L  NL  NB  NB 
20 S s   NAI  NAI  I  NI  I  NI  20 M s   L  NL  NB  NB 
 
Proof of Lemma A4. 
(i) Strategies subscripted by 3, 7 and 11: the manager has the incentive to deviating to NL when the 
company is worth  L V , as he would get the same payoff without lying, which he prefers under our   42 
assumptions.  Strategies 12, 16 and 20: by the same argument, the manager has the incentive to 
deviating to NL when the company is worth  H V . 
(ii) Strategy 5: the manager has the incentive to deviate to L when the company is worth  H V , as he 
would  induce  the  investment  with  no  auditing,  hence  saving  his  fraction  of  the  auditing  costs. 
Strategy  18:  by  the  same  argument,  the  manager  has  the  incentive  to  deviate  to  NL  when  the 
company is worth  H V . 
(iii) Strategy 6: the manager has the incentive to deviate to L when the company is worth  H V . To 
see this, consider that by this deviation he would induce the investment with auditing and earn the 
continuation profit  0 ( )
c
M H V V F I D D g P = + - - - + , which is positive by assumption. Strategy 13: 
by the same argument, the manager has the incentive to deviate to NL when the company is worth 
H V . 
(iv) Strategy 8: the manager has the incentive to deviate to L when the company is worth  H V , as he 
would  induce  investment  rather  than  no  investment,  and  thereby  earn  the  continuation  profit 
0 ( ) 0
c
M H V V I D D g P = + - - + > .  Strategy  19:  by  the  same  argument,  the  manager  has  the 
incentive to deviate to NL when the company is worth  H V .   ￿ 
 
Proof of Proposition 1.    Based on Lemma A4, the remaining 8 set of candidate equilibrium 
strategies  are  subscripted  by  { } 1,2,4,9,10,14,15,17 .  We  will  show  that,  of  these,  only  those 
subscripted by 1 and 2 are part of a PBE for  0 D D £ , whereas the other six are not. 
(i) { }
* * *
1 1 1 , , S M s s b , where  *
1 S s and  *
1 M s  are given by Table A1, and  *
1 b  is the following belief: 
*
1 ( ) ( , ) ( , ) 0, ( ) 1, ( , ) ( , ) .
(1 )(1 )
L L L H L H H H L H
p
V V V V V V V V V V
p p q
b b b b b b b
 
= = = = = = =  
+ - -  
     
In  this  candidate  equilibrium,  M  does  not  lie  and  S  invest  according  to  M’s  report.  Hence  the 
investment decision leads to the first-best expected profit  * ( ) ( ) H E p V I P = - , of which M diverts 
an amount D. Thus, S earn their maximal expected payoff  [ ] 0 (1 ) ( ) H V p V I D g - + - - . They have 
eight possible deviations from  *
1 S s , which correspond to the strategies subscripted by 2 to 7, 9 and 
11 in Table A1. In the deviations subscripted by 2, 7 and 11, their expected payoff is lower because   43 
they  rely  on  a  suboptimal  investment  decision  rule.  In  all  the  other  deviations,  their  payoff  is 
decreased by the auditor’s fee and in some cases also by reliance on a suboptimal investment rule. 
As a result, all possible deviations yield a lower expected payoff to S than that of the candidate 
equilibrium. 
Now consider the possible deviations by M from the strategy  *
1 M s . In the candidate equilibrium, M 
earns the highest possible payoff  0 ( ) H V V I D D g + - - +  in the good state and  0 V g  in the bad state. 
Therefore, M will never deviate to lying in the good state, since this would produce no investment 
and he would earn  0 V g . If he deviates to lying in the bad state, S would invest in this state, so that 
M’s payoff would be  0 0 ( ) L V V I D D V g g + - - + <  for  0 D D £ . Hence, both possible deviations 
yield a lower payoff to M than that of the candidate equilibrium. 
The  belief  *
1 b is  consistent  with  Lemma  A1  insofar  as  ( , ),  ( , ), ( , ) L L H L H H V V V V V V b b b      and 
( , ) L H V V b  are concerned. Also  ( ) 0 L V b =  and  ( ) 1 H V b =  are consistent with Bayes’ rule, given 
M’s strategy  *
1 M s . Hence { }
* * *
1 1 1 , , S M s s b  is a PBE. 
(ii) { }
* * *
2 2 2 , , S M s s b , where  *
2 S s and  *
2 M s  are given by Table A1, and  *
2 b  is the following belief: 
*
2 ( ) ( , ) ( , ) 0, ( ) 1, ( , ) ( , ) .
(1 )(1 )
H L L H L L H H L H
p
V V V V V V V V V V
p p q
b b b b b b b
 
= = = = = = =  
+ - -  
     
In this candidate equilibrium, M always lies and S invests when M reports  L V  and does not when M 
reports  H V , consistently with their new beliefs  ( ) 1 L V b =  and  ( ) 0 H V b = . Again, the investment 
decision leads to the first-best expected profit, and, following the same steps as under point (i), it is 
easy to show that there are no profitable deviations and that beliefs are consistent with Bayes’ rule.  
(iii)  4 S s  and  4 M s  cannot be part of an equilibrium: these strategies imply a smaller expected 
payoff for M than a deviation to NL in the bad state, which would give him  0 V g .  To see this, note 
that under  4 S s  and  4 M s  in the bad state M would lie, and S would hire an auditor and invest with 
probability  1 q - .  As  a  result,  M’s  expected  payoff  would  be 
[ ] 0 (1 )( ) (1 ) L V q V I D F q D g + - - - - + - ,  which  is  increasing  in  D.  Hence,  in  the  region  under 
consideration this payoff achieves its maximum for  0 D D = . From (5), this maximum payoff is   44 
0 ( ) V F g - . If instead M deviates to NL in the bad state, there is no investment and a payoff of  0 V g  
for M.  
(iv)  9 S s  and  9 M s  cannot be part of an equilibrium. Under these strategies, S do not hire an auditor 
and always invest, so that they earn the unconditional payoff  0 (1 )( ) V V I D g - + - - . If instead they 
deviate  to  auditing,  the  investment  decision  would  lead  to  a  total  expected  profit 
0 0 ( ) (1 )(1 )( ) (1 ) ( ) . H L L V p V I p q V I F V V I p q I V F + - + - - - - = + - + - - -  Then, M would divert 
an amount D whenever the investment is made, which happens with probability  (1 )(1 ) p p q + - - . 
As a result, S would earn a fraction 1 g -  of the total expected profit minus the expected diversion 
[ ] (1 )(1 ) p p q D + - - .  Thus,  after  rearranging  it,  their  payoff  can  be  written  as 
{ } 0 (1 ) (1 ) ( ) L V V I D p q I V D F g - + - - + - - + - . This deviation payoff can be shown to be larger 
than the unconditional profit  0 (1 )( ) V V I D g - + - - . To see this, consider that if S hire an auditor, 
they  would  choose  the  profit-maximizing  audit  quality  * q ,  defined  by  condition  (10): 
* '( ) (1 )( ) L C q p I V D = - - + .  The difference between S’s deviation payoff and their payoff in the 
candidate  equilibrium  is  * * (1 ) (1 )( ) ( ) L q p I V D C q g   - - - + - =  
* * * (1 ) '( ) ( ) 0 q C q C q g   - - >     by 
the convexity of  ( ) C q . Hence, this deviation by S is profitable. 
(v)  15 S s  and  15 M s  cannot be part of an equilibrium, since the argument under point (iii) above 
can be used to show that these strategies imply a smaller payoff for M, than a deviation to L. 
 (vi)  Using the argument under (iv), one can rule out that the remaining three couples of strategies 
10 10 ( , ) S M s s   ,  14 14 ( , ) S M s s   17 17 ( , ) S M s s   are part of an equilibrium.     ￿ 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 2.    As in the proof of Proposition 1, based on Lemma A4 we focus only on 
the 8 candidate equilibrium strategies subscripted by { } 1,2,4,9,10,14,15,17 . We will show that, of 
these, only those subscripted by 4 and 15 may be part of a PBE for  0 1 D D D < £ , whereas the other 
six are not. 
(i) { }
* * *
4 4 4 , , S M s s b , where  *
4 S s and  *
4 M s  are given by Table 1, and the belief  *
4 b  is:   45 
*
4 ( ) ( , ) ( , ) 0, ( ) , ( , ) ( , ) .
(1 )(1 )
L L L H L H H H L H
p
V V V V V V p V V V V
p p q
b b b b b b b
 
= = = = = = =  
+ - -  
     
In this candidate equilibrium, M always reports  H V  (and therefore lies in the bad state), S hires an 
auditor under the contract specified in Lemma 1, and invest according to A’s report. Thus, S’s 
payoff is given by equation (7). Recall that in point (iv) of the proof of Proposition 1 we have 
shown that, for  0 1 D D D < £ , the payoff to S from hiring an auditor exceeds that obtainable from 
any  strategy  involving  NA.  In  the  present  context,  this  implies  that  S  will  not  deviate  to  such 
strategies.  
Now consider the possible deviations by M from the strategy  *
4 M s . In the candidate equilibrium, M 
earns  the  highest  possible  payoff  0 ( ) H V V I D D g + - - +   in  the  good  state  and 
[ ] 0 (1 )( ) (1 ) L V q V I D F q D g + - - - - + -  in the bad state. Therefore, M will never deviate to lying 
in the good state, since this would produce no investment and he would earn  0 V g . If he deviates to 
not lying in the bad state, S would not invest, so that M’s payoff would be  0 V g . This deviation is 
not profitable if  ˆ D D ³ , where 









= - +   - -  
. For  ˆ D D < , the deviation is profitable, 
so that this equilibrium will not exist. 
The  belief  *
4 b   is  consistent  with  Lemma  A1  insofar  as  ( , ),  ( , ), ( , ) L L H L H H V V V V V V b b b      and 
( , ) L H V V b  are concerned. Also  ( ) H V p b =  are consistent with Bayes’ rule, given M’s strategy 
*
4 M s . Finally,  ( ) 0 L V b =  is such that NANI upon a negative report by M is sequentially rational, 
since under this belief the expected payoff to S from  *
4 S s  is ( ) 0 1 V g - , while by deviating to NAI 
they  would  obtain  0 (1 )( ) L V V I D g - + - - ,  and  by  deviating  to  A  they  would  obtain 
[ ] 0 (1 ) (1 )( ) L V q V I D F g - + - - - - .  Hence { }
* * *
4 4 4 , , S M s s b  is a PBE. 
(ii)  { }
* * *
15 15 15 , , S M s s b ,  where  *
15 S s and  *
15 M s   are  given  by  Table  A1,  and  the  belief  *
15 b   is: 
*
15 ( ) ( , ) ( , ) 0, ( ) , ( , ) ( , ) .
(1 )(1 )
H L L H L L H H L H
p
V V V V V V p V V V V
p p q
b b b b b b b
 
= = = = = = =  
+ - -  
   
In this candidate equilibrium, M always reports  L V  (and therefore lies in the good state), S hires an 
auditor under the contract specified in Lemma 1, and invest according to A’s report. The proof that 
this is a PBE for  ˆ D D ³  proceeds as under point (i).   46 
(iii)  1 S s  and  1 M s  cannot be part of an equilibrium, because M has the incentive to deviate to L 
when the company is worth  L V . 
(iv)  2 S s  and  2 M s  cannot be part of an equilibrium, because M has the incentive to deviate to NL 
when the company is worth  L V . 
(v)  9 S s  and  9 M s  cannot be part of an equilibrium, because under this strategy the firm would 
always invest and S would earn its unconditional payoff, while if it hires an auditor by Proposition 1 
point (iv) they would increase their payoff. 
(vi)  10 10 ( , ) S M s s ,  14 14 ( , ) S M s s  and  17 17 ( , ) S M s s  cannot be part of an equilibrium, by the same 
argument as under (v).     ￿ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3.    As in the proof of Propositions 1 and 2, based on Lemma A4 we focus 
only on the 8 candidate equilibrium strategies subscripted by { } 1,2,4,9,10,14,15,17 . We will show 
that, of these, only those subscripted by 10 and 17 are part of a PBE for  1 D D > , whereas the other 
six are not. 
(i) { }
* * *
10 10 10 , , S M s s b , where  *
10 S s  is given by Table A1,  *
10 M s  is obtained by replacing NB to B 
in the corresponding strategy in Table A1, and the belief  *
10 b  is: 
{ }
*
10 ( ) ( , ) ( , ) 0, ( ) , ( , ) ( , ) . L L L H L H H H L H V V V V V V p V V V V p b b b b b b b = = = = = = =      
In this candidate equilibrium, M always reports  H V  (and therefore lies in the bad state), S do not 
hire an auditor and the firm always invests. Thus, S’s payoff is given by equation (11). To show that 
S will not want to deviate from  *
10 S s , note that the payoff to S exceeds that from any strategy 
involving  A  upon  a  positive  report  by  M,  since  due  to  bribing  an  audit  report  would  be 
uninformative (would lead to investment anyway) but still costly. The payoff in equation (11) also 
exceeds the payoff from a strategy involving NANI upon a positive report by M, which is( ) 0 1 V g - .   
Now consider the possible deviations by M from the strategy  *
10 M s . In the candidate equilibrium, 
M  earns  the  highest  possible  payoff  0 ( ) H V V I D D g + - - +   in  the  good  state  and 
0 0 ( ) L V V I D D V g g + - - + >  in the bad state, where the latter inequality is guaranteed by  1 D D > .   47 
Therefore, M will never deviate in the good state. If he deviates to not lying in the bad state, S 
would not invest, so that M’s payoff would be  0 V g . 
The belief  *
10 b  is consistent with  Lemma  A1 insofar  as  ( , ),  ( , ), ( , ) L L H L H H V V V V V V b b b     and 
( , ) L H V V b  are concerned. Also  ( ) H V p b =  are consistent with Bayes’ rule, given M’s strategy. 
Finally,  ( ) 0 L V b =  is such that NANI upon a negative report by M is sequentially rational, since 
under this belief the expected payoff to S from  *
10 S s  is ( ) 0 1 V g - , while by deviating to NAI or to A 
they  would  obtain  0 (1 )( ) L V V I D g - + - -   or  0 (1 )( ) L V V I D F g - + - - - respectively.  Hence 
{ }
* * *
10 10 10 , , S M s s b  is a PBE. 
(ii) { }
* * *
17 17 17 , , S M s s b , where  *
17 S s  is given by Table A1,  *
17 M s  is obtained by replacing NB to B 
in the corresponding strategy in Table A1, and the belief  *
17 b  is: 
{ }
*
17 ( ) ( , ) ( , ) 0, ( ) , ( , ) ( , ) . H L L H L L H H L H V V V V V V p V V V V p b b b b b b b = = = = = = =      
In this candidate equilibrium, M always reports  L V  (and therefore lies in the good state), S does not 
hire an auditor and the firm always invests. The proof that this is a PBE for  1 D D >  proceeds as 
under point (i). 
(iii)  1 S s  and  1 M s  cannot be part of an equilibrium, because M has the incentive to deviate to L 
when the company is worth  L V . 
(iv)  2 S s  and  2 M s  cannot be part of an equilibrium, because M has the incentive to deviate to NL 
when the company is worth  L V . 
(v)  9 S s   and  9 M s   cannot  be  part  of  an  equilibrium.  For  these  strategies  to  be  part  of  an 
equilibrium,  one  would  need  a  belief  ( ) L V b   such  that,  upon  a  negative  report  by  M,  A  is 
sequentially rational. However, A is not rational for any possible belief  ( ) L V b , as it would imply 
that the firm always invests and S earns its unconditional payoff net of the audit cost, while under 
NAI shareholders would save the audit cost.  
(vi)  14 S s   and  14 M s   cannot  be  part  of  an  equilibrium.  For  these  strategies  to  be  part  of  an 
equilibrium,  one  would  need  a  belief  ( ) H V b   such  that,  upon  a  positive  report  by  M,  A  is   48 
sequentially rational. However, A is not rational for any possible belief  ( ) H V b , as it would imply 
that the firm always invests and S earns its unconditional payoff net of the audit cost, while under 
NAI shareholders would save the audit cost. 
(vii)  4 4 ( , ) S M s s  and  15 15 ( , ) S M s s  cannot be part of an equilibrium, because for  1 D D >  M would 
bribe the auditor, so that the audit report is uninformative but still costly, and therefore S would 
deviate to NAI.     ￿ 
 
Proof of Proposition 4. To induce truth-telling by the manager, shareholders must choose a couple 
of payments  H
H w  and  L
L w  to compensate the manager who reports the true state of the world and a 
couple of payments  H
L w  and  L
H w  for the manager who reports the wrong state. Hence, they solve:  
   ( ) 0
, , ,
( ) max (1 )
H L H L
H H L L
H L
M H H L
w w w w
r V p V I D w p w P = + - - - - - , 
subject to: 
 
( ) : (1 ) 0,
: ,
: ,







H L H L
H H L L
PC p w D p w
IC w w D
IC w D w
LL w w w w
+ + - ³
³ +
+ ³
³ ³ ³ ³
 
where  M PC  is the manager’s participation constraint,  L IC  and  H IC  are his incentive compatibility 
constraint in the bad and good states respectively, and LL is his limited liability constraint. It is 
immediate that  H
L w  and  L
H w  should both be set equal to zero. Moreover,  L IC  and the LL for  H
H w  
are both binding, which implies  0 H
H w =  and  L
L w D = .    ￿ 
 




, , , ,




A H H L L L
w w w q F
r V p V I D w q p V I D w q p w F
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where  H w  is the payment to the manager who reports the good state,  q
L w  the payment to the 
manager if the auditor correctly reports the bad state (which happens with probability q), and  1 q
L w -  
is the payment to the manager if the auditor mistakenly reports the good state (which happens with 
probability  1 q - ).  It  is  immediate  that  both  H w   and  1 q
L w -   should  both  be  set  equal  to  zero. 
Moreover,  L IC  is binding if  D B > , which implies that the payment to compensate a manager if 
the auditor correctly reported the bad state is  q
L w D B = - . If on the contrary  D B £ ,  L IC  is slack 
so that  0 q
L w = , due to the limited liability constraint. Competition ensures that in all cases the 
auditor’s participation constraint  A PC  is also binding. As a result, if  D B >  the optimal audit 
quality is  ** q  as implicitly defined by (12), while if  D B £  the optimal audit quality is  * q  as 
implicitly defined by (10). So if  D B >  the audit quality is increasing in the reservation bribe  B  
(and independent of D), while if D B £  it is increasing in D (and independent of B ). ￿ 
 
Proof of Proposition 6.  Recalling from the analysis in Section 4 that eliciting truth-telling from the 
manager always dominates using no information, we now want to identify the parameter regions 
where shareholders prefer to elicit truth-telling from the manager or from the auditor. Substituting 
the optimal values from Propositions 4 and 5, the shareholders’ profits become respectively:  
( ) 0 ( ) (1 ) M H r V p V I D p D P = + - - - - , 
P(rA) =V0 + p(VH - I - D)+ (1- p)(1-q
*)(VL - I - D)-C(q
*) if D B £ , 
and  
** ** **
0 ( ) ( ) (1 ) (1 )( ) ( ) ( ) A H L r V p V I D p q V I D q D B C q   P = + - - + - - - - - - -   , if D B > ,  
where q
* and  ** q  are defined by equations (10) and (12), respectively.    50 
Subtracting  ( ) M r P   from  ( ) A r P   and  rearranging  terms  yields  the  condition  under  which 
shareholders want to elicit the truth from the auditor. If  D B £ , this condition is inequality (14) in 
the text, while if D B > , it becomes: 
         ** ** ** (1 ) (1 )( ) ( ) 0 L p q V I q B C q   - - - + - >   .     (15) 
There are two cases to be considered, depending on whether condition (14) holds or not. 
If (14) holds, for  D B £  shareholders rely on auditing, setting audit quality at  q
* and managerial 
severance  pay  at  zero.  Then,  by  continuity,  condition  (15)  also  holds  for  B D- ®   (where 
q q * ** ® ). Using the envelope theorem, the derivative of expression (15) with respect to  B  is 
equal to  ** (1 ) 0 p q - > . Therefore, as  B  decreases below D, inequality (15) eventually turns into an 
equality for a threshold  0 B  defined by 










B q B I V
p q B
 
  º - - +
  -
   
                      (16) 
where  **
0 ( ) q B  is obtained by setting  0 B B =  in (12). Therefore, shareholders will still rely on the 
auditor’s report in the interval  0 [ , ) B D . In this interval, audit quality is set at  ** q  (and therefore is 
increasing in  B ) and managerial severance pay is  D B - . For  0 B B < , instead,  ( ) ( ) A M r r P < P , so 
that shareholders elect to rely on the manager’s report, raise his severance pay to D, and no longer 
hire an auditor ( 0 q = ).  
If instead (14) does not hold, then by the previous argument condition (15) does not hold either, and 
therefore for any value of  B  shareholders choose to rely on the manager’s report, the manager is 
given severance pay D and no auditor is ever hired. ￿ 
 





t = 1 
Nature chooses 
state:  H V or  L V  
 
t = 2 
Manager learns 
state of nature 
and decides to 
lie  or not  
t = 3 
Shareholders: 
· with no audit, choose 
to invest or not ⇒ 
game ends 
· if audit, choose quality 
q and game continues 
 
t = 4 
· Nature sends 
signal to auditor 
· Manager may 
bribe auditor 
· Auditor files 
report to 
shareholders 
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Figure 2. Game tree   53 
P  '' P      P' = P''- B / (1-g )   0 
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Figure 3. Audit quality q as function of shareholder protection P  
(for given auditing regulation B  and managerial equity stake g) 
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Figure 4. Audit quality q as function of strictness of auditing regulation B  
(for given shareholder protection P and managerial equity stake g) 
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Figure 5. Audit quality q as function of shareholder protection P and 
strictness of auditing regulation B  (for given managerial equity stake g ) 
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Figure 6. Optimal audit quality q and severance pay s 
as functions of the strictness of auditing regulation B  (for given P) 
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Figure 7. Optimal audit quality q and severance pay s 
as functions of shareholder protection P (for given  0 B B > ) 
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Figure 8. Optimal audit quality q and severance pay s 
as functions of shareholder protection P (for given  0 B B < ) 
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Figure 9. Optimal audit quality q as function of shareholder protection P and 
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Figure 10. Optimal severance pay s as function of shareholder protection P  
and strictness of auditing regulation B  
 